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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 
78-2-2(3)(c), and Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4 inasmuch as it involves 
a disciplinary matter: the petition for readmission of a disbarred respondent 
pursuant to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"). The case 
also involves matters of admission to practice, and as such is also within the 
Court's jurisdiction through its authority to govern the practice of law. See Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 4; see also In re Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, fl 5. 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Each of the issues identified by the Petitioner/Appellant is a question of 
law. On appeal, the Court affords no deference to the District Court's 
conclusions of law, but reviews them for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). To the extent that Schwenke's appeal represents an 
appeal from the Board of Bar Commissioners' application of the Rules Governing 
Admission ("RGA"), the Court exercises its judgment independent of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar ("Board") whenever the Court deems 
appropriate. See In re Arnovick. 2002 UT 71, U 5. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Rule Six, Character & Fitness, Rules Governing Admission to the Utah State Bar 
Rule Fourteen, Readmission after Resignation or Disbarment, Section 14-2, 
Rules Governing Admission to the Utah State Bar 
Rule 25, Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months; 
readmission, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
Each of the foregoing is reproduced in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Petitioner/Appellant, A. Paul Schwenke, is a person who was once 
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, but who was disbarred and now 
seeks readmission. The case thus involves matters of discipline and of 
admission, and of the proper application of the RLDD and the RGA.1 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 
Schwenke initiated the court action by filing a petition in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court. (R. 1-37) The venue was subsequently changed to the Third 
Judicial District Court. (R. 271-271B) The District Court denied Schwenke's 
petition for readmission to the Utah State Bar. (R. 749-756) This appeal 
followed. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Schwenke was disbarred in 1993, and ordered to pay restitution in the 
amount of $97,250. (R. 7-10) Schwenke's disbarment was imposed for 
misappropriation based on fraud in connection with representing a client in a 
personal injury matter.2 (R. 7) 
Schwenke applied for admission to the Utah State Bar by means of an 
application dated March 7, 2001.3 (R. 45-70) 
1
 The RGA are also sometimes referred to elsewhere in the record as the "Rules 
for Admission," or "RFA". 
2
 The written opinion of this Court concerning Schwenke's disbarment is in the 
District Court record beginning at R. 342; the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Recommendation of Discipline of the Hearing Panel of the Board of Bar 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar begins at R. 351. 
3
 Schwenke did not submit the application until April 3, 2001. (R. 39) 
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The RGA require a character and fitness investigation concerning every 
applicant to the Bar. The Character and Fitness Committee uses a private 
investigator to investigate each applicant, during which information is gathered 
concerning, among other things, the applicant's criminal background, credit 
history, and driving record. (R. 82) After its preliminary investigation, the 
Character and Fitness Committee reviewed Schwenke's application and denied 
his application to sit for the July 2001 bar exam. (R. 82) 
By letter dated May 29 and sent by certified mail, the Utah State Bar 
informed Schwenke that his application for admission had been denied. (R. 31-
32; 72-73) The letter informed Schwenke that the Character and Fitness 
Committee denied his application after considering factors such as Schwenke's 
theft of client funds, the existence of unsatisfied judgments against him, 
numerous pending civil actions, neglect of his financial responsibilities, and his 
history of arrests, including convictions for driving while intoxicated. (R. 31; 72) 
The letter informed him that he "failed to establish a record of conduct that 
justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the 
professional duties owed them. The application demonstrates a significant 
deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability required of an 
applicant for the Utah State Bar." (R. 31-32; 72-73) 
Pursuant to Schwenke's request, a formal hearing was conducted 
concerning Schwenke's application. (R. 83) The Character and Fitness 
Committee had not issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Recommendation at the time Schwenke approached the District Court for relief; 
they were issued on August 10, 2001. (R. 83) 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the 
Character and Fitness Committee detail the findings and conclusions for its 
recommendation to deny Schwenke's request for readmission. (R. 366-376) 
These included findings that are summarized as follows: 
Schwenke confessed to a judgment in fraud in the sum of $100,000, less 
certain credits and the value of proceeds from a sale of property. (R. 366-
367) 
Schwenke was disbarred for his professional misconduct and ordered to 
pay restitution in the amount of $97,250. (R. 367) 
The person to whom Schwenke should have paid restitution received a 
nominal amount of money, after which she unsuccessfully attempted to 
satisfy the balance of the judgment. Ultimately she assigned the 
stipulated judgment to a third party for $10,000. (R. 367) 
The matter was later satisfied to the benefit of the third party from the 
proceeds of a foreclosure sale on Schwenke's residence. (R. 368) 
As of June 26, 2001 [when the Character and Fitness Committee was 
reviewing Schwenke's application], the person to whom Schwenke should 
have paid restitution had not received direct payment from Schwenke. (R. 
368) The findings noted, "Schwenke has not attempted to repay Ms. 
Bischel and did not express any remorse for her circumstances that are a 
direct result of his dishonest actions." (R. 368) 
Schwenke testified that the stipulated judgment had been fully satisfied. 
(R. 368) 
The findings stated, "Schwenke has not demonstrated the diligence and 
reliability required of an attorney seeking to rectify the damage caused by 
his wrongful acts. Furthermore, Schwenke expressed no remorse for the 
damages suffered by Bischel and referred only to the 'heartaches and 
whatnot' Schwenke had experienced since being disbarred. Under the 
facts of this case, the Committee finds that Schwenke's testimony that he 
has accepted blame for the incident involving Ms. Bischel that lead [sic] to 
his eventual disbarment is not credible." (R. 368) 
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"Despite being on notice of the committee's concern regarding 
Schwenke's financial history, Schwenke failed, either through omission or 
evasive statements, to provide the Committee with a complete and 
accurate description of his business dealings." (R. 369; 370) 
Although Schwenke testified that he receives approximately $50,000 
annually in advances or distributions, he also testified that he does not 
report that income to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). (R. 370) 
Schwenke has not filed tax returns with the IRS or the Utah State Tax 
Commission since 1996. (R. 371) 
Although Schwenke admitted that he personally received approximately 
$1.5 million from the sale of assets of a bankrupt corporation, he used no 
portion of it to pay any portion of the debt he owed to the person to whom 
he was required to pay restitution, and no portion of it to pay a student 
loan debt "in which the creditor had to resort to collection by civil 
complaint," or to pay tax liens of approximately $1,000,000. (R. 370-371) 
Schwenke testified that after the tax liens were entered, he has conducted 
his affairs on a "cash-only basis." (R. 371) Schwenke's purpose in doing 
so is "to frustrate the collection effort of the IRS." (R. 371) 
Schwenke lives in a house that is owned by a bank and is the subject of 
pending civil litigation. (R. 371) "Based on the evasive answer provided 
to the question of whether Schwenke has permission to occupy the 
residence and the pending eviction action referenced above, the 
Committee concludes that he does not." 
Schwenke testified that he is a defendant in seven civil actions involving 
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, and recently confessed 
judgment for $18,000 to $20,000 in one case involving what he termed 
breach of an unsecured promissory note. (R. 372) 
Schwenke's application stated that he had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
but in fact he filed for relief under Chapter 13. (R. 372) There are other 
discrepancies between the information he provided in the application and 
what the record establishes. (R. 373) The Committee found that his 
application statements were "incomplete, false and misleading." 
Schwenke has been arrested three times since 1987 for driving while 
intoxicated, but has not been convicted. (R. 373) He does not believe he 
has a drinking problem. (R. 373) 
Schwenke's driver's license has been suspended since August 2000, but 
when asked whether he has a current license "I believe I do, bu t . . . . " (R. 
374) 
5 
The Committee repeatedly found in connection with the foregoing that 
"Schwenke's conduct demonstrates a disregard for the law and involves 
acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and abuse of the legal 
process." (R. 370; 371; 372) 
The Committee unanimously concluded that "Schwenke's conduct since 
his disbarment and his lack of candor and failure to accurately and 
thoroughly complete the Bar Application demonstrates serious 
deficiencies regarding (a) lack of candor, (b) unlawful conduct, (c) making 
of false and misleading statements, including omissions regarding the Bar 
Application, (d) acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation, (g) abuse of legal process, (h) neglect of financial 
responsibilities, ( i) neglect of professional obligations associated with 
repaying Ms. Bischel, and (n) past or pending disciplinary action by a 
lawyer disciplinary agency or other professional disciplinary agency of any 
jurisdiction." (R. 375) 
The Committee "gave serious consideration and appropriate weight to 
Schwenke's assertion that his attempt to be readmitted to the practice of 
law was motivated in large part by what Schwenke perceives to be a lack 
of adequate legal representation for members of the Polynesian 
community in Utah." This single assertion weighed against his "lack of 
candor in the admission process, lack of evidence of rehabilitation, the 
seriousness of his prior misconduct and failure to pay restitution, the 
materiality of his omissions and misrepresentations, and the cumulative 
effect of the conduct and information gathered during the course of the 
hearing and the evaluation process, and unanimously finds Schwenke 
completely and utterly failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he 
should be readmitted to the Bar." (R. 376) 
Schwenke filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court a Verified Petition for 
Reinstatement to Membership of the Utah State Bar ("Verified Petition") on July 
3, 2001. (R. 1-37) Schwenke signed the Verified Petition on June 29; and the 
Certificate of Hand-Delivery stated "I hand-delivered a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Verified Petition for Reinstatement to Membership in the Utah State 
Bar to the Office of Professional Conduct at the Utah Law & Justice Center, 645 
South 200 East, Salt Lake City, 84111 this 29th day of June 2001." (R. 5) 
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The Utah Law and Justice Center houses the Utah State Bar and its 
Admissions office, as well as the OPC. (R. 640) It also houses other tenants, 
including the Judicial Conduct Commission, the Utah Trial Lawyers' Association, 
and Attorney's Title Guarantee. (R. 641-642) Each of the foregoing shares the 
services of a receptionist seated in the main lobby. (R. 641; 634-635) The OPC 
is housed on the main floor behind locked doors with a security system. (R. 640) 
The Admissions office is on the building's top floor. 
The Utah Law and Justice Center lobby receptionist is not authorized to 
accept service on behalf of any tenant in the building, including the OPC. (R. 
635; 640) The receptionist is not supervised or employed by the OPC. (R. 635) 
The receptionist date-stamps all hand-deliveries for the OPC, and notifies the 
OPC to pick them up. (R. 635; 640) The receptionist does not deliver 
documents to the OPC. (R. 635) The receptionist has been specifically 
instructed on this policy, which differs from the policy for handling similar matters 
for other entities housed in the Law and Justice Center. (R. 635) 
The person who was then the receptionist spoke with the person who 
delivered Schwenke's documents. (R. 635; 639-640) That person informed the 
receptionist that the documents were for "admissions," and did not inform her that 
the person wanted to serve documents upon the OPC. (R. 635; 640) 
Accordingly, the receptionist contacted the Deputy General Counsel in Charge of 
Admissions, and had the documents delivered to her. (R. 635; 640) 
The Deputy General Counsel reviewed the hand-delivered documents, 
which were documents relating to Schwenke's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. (R. 
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671; 640) In the course of reviewing the Petition for Extraordinary Writ with the 
Utah State Bar's General Counsel, the Deputy General Counsel discovered the 
Verified Petition among the other materials in the hand-delivered packet. (R. 
671; 640) Neither the Deputy General Counsel nor the General Counsel has 
authority to accept service of petitions for readmission, nor have they the 
authority to respond to such a petition. (R. 671) 
The following day, which was a Saturday, the Deputy General Counsel 
delivered a copy of the Verified Petition to the residence of the OPC's Senior 
Counsel. (R. 671; 640) The first time the Verified Petition arrived at the OPC 
offices was not by service, but rather by happenstance on Monday, July 2, 2001. 
(R. 640) Schwenke never served the Verified Petition on OPC counsel; the OPC 
only obtained a copy by inadvertence because the Deputy General Counsel 
noticed it among what had been characterized by Schwenke's agent as the 
"admissions" papers. (R. 640-641) 
The Verified Petition stated that Schwenke fully complied with the terms 
and conditions of disbarment, including following the relevant notification 
requirements and paying restitution. (R. 1-2) The Verified Petition also stated 
that Schwenke has not engaged in or attempted to engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law during the period of his disbarment. (R. 2) 
The Verified Petition also contended as follows: 
The Petitioner has the honesty and integrity to practice law. 
Nonetheless, the Bar's Character and Fitness Committee 
("committee") has denied Petitioner's application to sit for the July 
2001 Bar Examination.... Since the denial and prior to the filing of 
this petition, the Petitioner appeared before the committee. 
Petitioner object [sic] to the committee's usurpation of the exclusive 
8 
jurisdiction of the District Court, under Rule 25 of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability, to reinstate or not to reinstated 
[sic] Petitioner, by denying him the opportunity to take the bar 
examination which is one of the criteria for the district court to 
reinstate or readmit Petitioner. In the event the committee issues a 
recommendation against Petitioner's admission, Petitioner 
respectfully requests the court abate this requirement in light of the 
substantial evidence to be presented at a hearing of this matter 
from the community at large and more particularly the Polynesian 
community for Petitioner's readmission. 
(R. 2 (citation omitted)) Schwenke thus asked the court to abate the requirement 
for a favorable committee recommendation. (R. 3-4) He also asked that the 
court abate the requirement that he take the bar examination and the Multistate 
Professional Responsibility Examination "because he has been wrongfully 
precluded from taking these examinations." (R. 4) He contends that the tests 
are unnecessary, in any case, because he has kept abreast of current legal 
developments and is competent to practice law. (R. 4) 
On the same date that Schwenke filed the Verified Petition, he also filed in 
the same court a Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the Office of Admissions, Utah 
State Bar ("Petition for Extraordinary Writ"). (R. 38-73) Therein, Schwenke 
asked the District Court to issue an extraordinary writ permitting Schwenke to sit 
for the July 2001 bar examination on the ground that "denial of his application to 
sit for the bar examination by the Utah State Bar's Character and Fitness 
Committee ("committee") was unlawful and a usurpation of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the district court to order reinstatement or readmission of the 
Petitioner." (R. 38; 42) 
The Court conducted an expedited hearing on Schwenke's Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ. (R. 124-125) The Utah State Bar was represented by its 
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General Counsel and its Deputy General Counsel.4 (R. 124) The Court denied 
Schwenke's request, indicating that Schwenke must "go through the 
administrative process." (R. 125) The Order provided that the RGA and the 
RLDD govern the matter in conjunction with one another, that Schwenke must 
apply as a student applicant for readmission and receive the Character and 
Fitness Committee's favorable endorsement. (R. 178) In the event that the 
recommendation is unfavorable, "the Court encourages Mr. Schwenke to avail 
himself of the administrative levels of appeal set forth in Rule Fourteen." (R. 178) 
The day after his expedited District Court hearing on the Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ, Schwenke filed in this Court an Emergency Petition to a 
Single Justice for an Extraordinary Writ to the Office of Admissions for the Utah 
State Bar. (R. 603-612) 
On July 23, 2001, the Utah Supreme Court denied Schwenke's request for 
an order requiring the Utah State Bar to allow Schwenke to sit for the July bar 
exam. (R. 176) The Order further provided, "The court will consider his petition 
in relation to the requirement of sitting for the Bar Examination pursuant to Rule 
25 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and issue an order in due 
course." (R. 176) Ultimately, the Court dismissed Schwenke's Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ. (R. 185) 
The OPC moved to transfer venue pursuant to the RLDD venue rule and 
Utah Code section 78-13-9(3), permitting a change of venue. (R. 132-134; 126-
4
 The OPC did not participate because this was an admissions matter, not a 
disciplinary matter. 
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131) The District Court granted the motion, transferring the case to the Third 
Judicial District. (R.271-271B) 
On August 30, the OPC filed a memorandum opposing the Verified 
Petition. (R. 328-416) That date was sixty days from the date upon which it 
serendipitously received a copy of the Verified Petition. (R. 640) The OPC 
noted, inter alia, that Schwenke had failed to meet each of the criteria listed in 
the applicable RLDD, having violated the prior disciplinary order, engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law during the period of his disbarment, and having 
failed to provide sufficient evidence of his honesty, integrity, and rehabilitation. 
(R. 328-416) The OPC further noted that Schwenke had not taken or passed the 
bar exam, nor had he taken and passed the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility exam. (R. 328-416) 
The OPC served discovery requests on Schwenke in late August 2001. 
(R. 417-418) When Schwenke failed to respond, the OPC moved for an order 
compelling his cooperation. (R. 519-523; 431-518) 
In response, Schwenke moved to strike the OPC's memorandum 
opposing his Verified Petition, as well as its discovery requests and motion to 
compel, along with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation issued by the Character and Fitness Committee. (R. 526-527) 
The OPC opposed these motions. (R. 637-647; 634-636; 662-666; 667-669; 
670-672; 673-697) 
The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 24, 2001. 
(R. 749-756) On the first day of the scheduled two-day hearing, the court 
n 
considered and denied Schwenke's Motion to Strike OPC's Opposition to the 
Verified Petition, to Strike the Character and Fitness Report, and to Strike the 
OPC's Discovery Requests. (R. 749-756) The Order noted, however, that "After 
making the orders as listed above, the Court then took a brief recess before the 
taking of evidence. After the recess, Mr. Schwenke and his co-counsel 
announced that Mr. Schwenke would not go forward with the presentation of his 
case." (R. 754) It continued: 
Pursuant to Rule 25(g) and 17(b) RLDD, Mr. Schwenke has the 
burden of establishing that he has met each of the criteria listed in 
Rule 25(e) RLDD, or if not, present good and sufficient reason why 
he should nevertheless be readmitted to the practice of law. 
The Court set this matter for a hearing and called this matter for a 
hearing. Mr. Schwenke elected not to present any evidence at the 
hearing. By failing to go forward with presenting evidence in 
support of his Verified Petition, Mr. Schwenke failed to meet his 
burden of proof. 
Therefore, this Court on its own motion rules that Mr. Schwenke's 
petition for readmission is hereby DENIED because he has 
declined to present any evidence. 
(R. 755) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a disbarred respondent, Schwenke must undergo the scrutiny of the 
Utah State Bar's Character and Fitness Committee pursuant to the RGA, then 
establish by clear and convincing evidence at the District Court that he is worthy 
of readmission consistent with the requirements of the RLDD. The Character 
and Fitness Committee and the District Court correctly followed the procedures 
governing the readmission of disbarred respondents and correctly found and 
concluded that Schwenke had not met the criteria set by the rules applicable at 
each stage of the proceedings. The rules themselves are constitutionally sound, 
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as is the regulatory scheme. The Court therefore should sustain the District 
Court's decision and decline to Schwenke's requests for relief in the form of 
abatement of the requirements or immediate readmission. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TWO BODIES OF RULES GOVERN THE READMISSION PROCESS 
AND EACH WAS APPLIED CORRECTLY BY THE RELEVANT 
AUTHORITY 
A. The Supreme Court Employs Its Rule-Making Powers to 
Regulate the Practice of Law Through the Promulgation of 
Several Bodies of Rules, Including the Rules Applicable to 
Readmission of Disbarred Respondents 
The Utah Constitution explicitly confers upon the Utah Supreme Court the 
power to regulate the practice of law, including admission and discipline. See 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4. Although this section of the Constitution is a relatively 
recent amendment, it codifies the Court's already-existing inherent authority over 
the regulation of the practice of law by attorneys. It is an authority that has 
existed from the beginning, regardless of whether there are parallel or confirming 
statutes, and, being an inherent authority, it is also exclusive.5 
The Supreme Court's rule-making powers are its means of regulating the 
practice of law. See Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4. Accordingly, the Court has 
established a procedure for adopting, modifying, and repealing rules. See Rule 
11-101 (Intent), Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. The Supreme 
Court Rules of Professional Practice "shall apply to the judiciary, the Utah State 
Bar and all other individuals and agencies participating in the rulemaking 
5
 This topic is also addressed infra in response to Schwenke's contention that the 
system for regulating the practice of law is a violation of the separation of powers 
clause. 
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process." id. (Applicability). The rule includes a reiteration of the Constitutional 
provision: "Finally, Section 4 provides that the Supreme Court shall by rule 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct 
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." ]d. at (1)(A) (Statement of the 
Rule). The rule further provides that "To assist the Court with these 
responsibilities, the Supreme Court hereby establishes a procedure for the 
adoption, repeal and amendment o f . . . rules governing the practice of law." Id. 
Pursuant to these procedures, the Court promulgated several bodies of 
rules to regulate the practice of law by attorneys. These are: (1) the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, promulgated pursuant to the integration of the Utah State 
Bar by the Supreme Court in June 1981 and Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution;6 (2) the RLDD, drafted by a subcommittee of the Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct and adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in a May 1993 minute entry;7 (3) the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, drafted by the Advisory Committee and adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in a May 1993 minute entry;8 and (4) the Utah State Bar Rules of 
Integration and Management, effective July 1, 1981, and revised from time to 
time thereafter.9 
The Court adopted rules for integration of the Bar "under the Court's own 
independent, inherent power derived from the historic and fundamental 
6
 See Rules of Professional Conduct, Compiler's Notes; In re Integration and 
Governance of the Utah State Bar. 632 P.2d 845 (Utah 1981). 
7
 See RLDD, Compiler's Notes and Summary. 
8
 See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compiler's Notes and 
Summary. 
9
 See Utah State Bar Rules of Integration and Management, Compiler's Note. 
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relationship between attorneys at law and the courts and the doctrine of 
separation of powers." See Barnard v. Utah State Bar 804 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 
1991). As the Court has explained, the rules "perpetuate, create and continue 
under the direction and control of this Court an organization known as the Utah 
State Bar," and require Bar membership for all lawyers practicing in the state. Id. 
After the Bar's integration, Article VIII of the Constitution was amended as 
discussed supraf making explicit its power to regulate the practice of law. id. 
Whereas the Supreme Court has exclusive authority to promulgate the 
rules and regulations governing the practice of law, it delegates to the Utah State 
Bar its authority to administer them. This delegation was made through the Utah 
State Bar Rules of Integration and Management ("Rules of Integration and 
Management"), which provide that: 
Under the power vested to it by the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and subject to the direction and control provided herein, the Utah 
Supreme Court hereby authorizes and designates the Utah State 
Bar to administer rules and regulations prescribed hereunder which 
govern the practice of law in Utah. All persons authorized to 
practice law in Utah shall be licensed by the Utah State Bar in 
accordance with the rules of the Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes a compelling state interest in 
its use of the Utah State Bar to assist the Court in governing 
admission to the practice of law, the conduct and discipline of 
persons admitted to practice law, and to improve the quality of legal 
services in the state. The Court also finds that the requirements 
imposed, the delegations made and the authority granted to the 
Utah State Bar provide the best ways to promote these compelling 
state interests, and that there are no less restrictive alternatives 
available to achieve those results. 
Rule I. A, Rules of Integration and Management. 
The Utah State Bar's delegated responsibility is to assist the Court in two 
regulatory functions: administering admissions exams and investigating the 
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fitness of applicants, and recommending proposed disciplinary action. See 
Barnard v. Utah State Ban 804 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1991). But the Bar has no 
power to discipline attorneys on its own authority, nor to admit attorneys to 
practice. 
Although the RLDD and the RGA usually are employed only in their 
respective areas of regulation, sometimes, as in this case, the rules overlap. 
Hence, although this case concerns the RLDD's requirements for readmission of 
a disbarred respondent, the case also necessarily concerns the application of the 
RGA by the Board: As the following subsections demonstrate, each body of 
rules was applied correctly by the relevant authority. 
B. Pursuant to the RGA, the Character and Fitness Committee 
Correctly Denied Schwenke's Application for Admission 
The Board recommends and certifies to the Supreme Court for admission 
"such persons, and only such persons, who possess the necessary qualifications 
of learning, ability and character which are a prerequisite to the privilege of 
engaging in the practice of law, and who fulfill the requirements for admission to 
the Bar." Rule Two, section 2-1, RGA. The Board can "appoint such committees 
in furtherance of the purpose of these rules and to facilitate their administration 
as may be necessary or advisable." id. at section 2-5. The Character and 
Fitness Committee is one such committee. 
Pursuant to the RGA, disbarred respondents who apply for readmission 
"shall satisfy all requirements of Rule 3 as stated above, and shall satisfy all 
other requirements imposed by the Supreme Court." Rule Fourteen, section 14-
2, RGA. In turn, Rule Three requires applicants to take and pass both days of 
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the bar examination, as well as the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination ("MPRE"). It also requires applicants to "be of good moral character 
and have satisfied the requirements of Rule 6," the rule governing applicants' 
character and fitness. 
The standard of character and fitness is explicitly stated: "An attorney 
should be one whose record of conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, 
courts, and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them." Rule 
Six, section 6-1, RGA. The rule also states that "An applicant whose record 
manifests a significant deficiency in honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or 
reliability shall be denied admission." jd. The applicant has the burden of proof 
to establish by "clear and convincing evidence" that the applicant has the 
requisite character and fitness to practice law." Id., section 6-3(c). 
Rule Six provides that "Investigations into the character and fitness of 
applicants may be informal, but shall be thorough, with the object of ascertaining 
the truth." Rule Six, section 6-2. The Character and Fitness Committee "may 
conduct an investigation and may act with or without requiring a personal 
appearance by an applicant." id. At the committee's discretion, an investigation 
panel interview may be conducted, and if the committee determines that the 
applicant should be denied, it shall promptly "notify the applicant by mail that the 
applicant has been denied and set forth generally the reasons for denial." Jd. 
In the event of a denial, the committee will conduct a formal hearing 
pursuant to the applicant's request. See Rule Six, section 6-3. This is a 
prerequisite to appeal. Id. Applicants are notified in advance of the hearing, and 
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are given "a statement of the preliminary factual matters of concern constituting 
the grounds for denial." Id. The hearing is a de novo proceeding where the 
applicant "has the burden of proof to establish his or her requisite character and 
fitness to practice law by clear and convincing evidence." IcJ. The applicant has 
the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, the right to examine all 
evidence, and the right to present witnesses and documentary evidence, id. 
Written findings and conclusions "should be issued no later than forty-five (45) 
days after the formal hearing and subsequent briefings, if any." ]d. 
The rule also provides for review of the committee's final decision. See 
Rule Six, section 6-6. Schwenke made no request for review. 
As this Court has stated, "Obviously, as the arm of this court, the Bar must 
do its utmost to adhere to the rules, policies, and procedures that we have 
approved for their governance." In re Amovick. 2002 UT 71, If 12. The 
Character and Fitness Committee correctly adhered to the procedures set forth in 
the RGA. 
All of the procedural requirements were met. Schwenke had the burden of 
proof in establishing his character and fitness to practice law. He filed the 
application, and the Character and Fitness Committee conducted its 
investigation.10 (R. 45-70; 82) It promptly notified Schwenke by certified mail of 
its decision not to approve him to sit for the bar exam. (R. 82; 31-32; 72-73) 
When Schwenke requested a formal hearing, he was provided with notice and an 
opportunity to appear, with right to counsel and all other safeguards. (FL 83) 
10
 Schwenke inaccurately contends that the investigation occurred after the 
committee's decision was made. (Brief of Appellant at 22) 
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The Character and Fitness Committee made its final decision not to certify 
Schwenke to take the exam. (R. 31; 72) The committee made written findings 
and conclusions, and delivered these to Schwenke pursuant to the rules. (R. 
366-376) Schwenke did not avail himself of the right to appeal, and therefore did 
not exhaust his remedies. 
The Committee's decision was well supported by the evidence11 and its 
findings concerning Schwenke's lack of candor alone are sufficient to justify the 
conclusion it reached. See e.g. In re Application of Maiorek. 508 N.W.2d 275, 
281 (Neb. 1993) (collecting cases); see also In re Application of McLaughlin, 675 
A.2d 1101,1103 (N.J. 1996) (recommendation withholding character certification 
in admission case based on applicant's pattern of lack of candor exhibited by 
failures to disclose or truthfully characterize his history). Moreover, Schwenke 
did not appeal its decision to the Board, as he was entitled to do under the RGA. 
C. Pursuant to the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the 
District Court Correctly Denied Schwenke's Verified Petition 
A disbarred respondent may be readmitted "only upon order of the district 
court." Rule 25(a), RLDD. The rule governing readmissions and reinstatements 
is not, as Schwenke contends, a "special proceeding for the benefit of the lawyer 
suspended over six months or disbarred, to expedite his or her application for 
membership in the Bar." (Brief of Appellant at 14, 17) Instead, the rule specifies 
procedures for respondents seeking reinstatement or readmission, and provides 
various means of evaluating and testing whether those who have committed 
11
 Schwenke has not challenged the accuracy of the committee's findings—only 
that they applied the wrong criteria. Indeed, he conceded that "perhaps under 
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serious ethical breaches in the past have undergone character changes so 
fundamental that there will be no repetition of the prior misconduct. 
Readmission is initiated through petition of the respondent. See id. Rule 
25(b), RLDD. The petition must "specify with particularity the manner in which 
the respondent meets each of the criteria specified in [another portion of the rule] 
or, if not, why there is otherwise good and sufficient reason for reinstatement or 
readmission." See id- The rule provides that a disbarred respondent may be 
readmitted "only if the respondent meets each of the following criteria, or if not, 
presents good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be . 
. . readmitted." Rule 25(e), RLDD (italics added). 
Rule 25 specifies criteria for readmission of disbarred respondents. See 
Rule 25, RLDD. The criteria are as follows: 
(1) The respondent has fully complied with the terms and 
conditions of all prior disciplinary orders except to the extent they 
are abated by the district court; 
(2) The respondent has not engaged or attempted to engage 
in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of . . . 
disbarment; 
(3) [any disability or impairment has been removed] 
(4) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was 
disciplined, the respondent has the requisite honesty and integrity 
to practice law. In readmission cases, the respondent must appear 
before the Bar's Character and Fitness Committee and cooperate 
with its investigation of the respondent. A copy of the Character 
and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation shall be 
forwarded to the district court assigned to the petition; 
(5) The respondent has kept informed about recent 
developments in the law and is competent to practice. 
(6) In cases of suspensions for one year or more, the 
respondent shall be required to pass the Multistate Professional 
Responsibility Examination. 
Rule 6-1, these subjective considerations by the committee are applicable, but 
not under the objective standard of Rule 25." (Brief of Appellant at 20) 
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(7) In all cases of disbarment, the respondent shall be 
required to pass the student applicant bar examination and the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. 
Rule 25(e), RLDD. 
The District Court considered these criteria, and correctly concluded that 
Schwenke had not met his burden, inasmuch as Schwenke presented no 
evidence at all at the hearing. It noted, "By failing to go forward with presenting 
evidence in support of his Verified Petition, Mr. Schwenke failed to meet his 
burden of proof." (R. 755) 
Moreover, the District Court correctly denied the request to abate the 
requirements. The criteria include a requirement that all disbarred respondents 
"pass the student application bar examination." See id. at 25(e)(7). For 
example, Schwenke did not pass the student application bar examination. 
Indeed, he did not take it. The District Court therefore could not order 
Schwenke's readmission unless it modified or abated this condition because 
Schwenke established "good and sufficient reason" for his readmission. The 
Verified Petition merely argued that he was wrongfully precluded, and therefore 
should not be required to take the exam. (R. 4) He added that he has kept 
abreast of current developments and "the substantial support from the public at 
large and the Polynesian community in particular for Petitioner's readmission 
should weigh in favor of immediate admission." (R. 4) Standing alone, these are 
insufficient reasons to abate an important requirement establishing a disbarred 
respondent's competency despite years away from practice. Additionally, the 
Multistate Professional Responsibility examination is not within the control of the 
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Utah State Bar—Schwenke may arrange to take that examination without the 
approval of the Character and Fitness Committee. 
Another example concerns Schwenke's request that the character and 
fitness requirement be abated. The Verified Petition merely stated that it should 
be abated "in light of the substantial evidence to be presented at the hearing of 
this matter from the community at large and more particularly the Polynesian 
community for Petitioner's readmission." (R. 2) Even if true, it is not enough, 
and in the end, Schwenke presented no evidence at all. 
Although Schwenke contends otherwise, the District Court is not the 
exclusive forum for reviewing the character and fitness of a disbarred 
respondent. The Character and Fitness Committee reviews applications of 
disbarred respondents seeking to take the bar exam, at the conclusion of which it 
makes a report that is submitted to the court. See Rule 25(e)(4), RLDD. The 
District Court conducts an independent evidentiary hearing in the event that the 
OPC files an objection to the petition for readmission, during which it considers 
additional evidence of the petitioner's character and fitness. See Rule 25(g), 
RLDD. Schwenke had an opportunity to present evidence of his character that 
might persuade the court to consider matters beyond the Character and Fitness 
Committee's report, but elected not to. 
II. NOTWITHSTANDING SCHWENKE'S FAILURE TO SERVE THE OPC, 
IT FILED AN OBJECTION AND DID SO IN A TIMELY MANNER IN 
RELATION TO THE DATE UPON WHICH IT ACTUALLY RECEIVED 
SCHWENKE'S VERIFIED PETITION 
The RLDD provide that a disbarred respondent seeking readmission "shall 
serve a copy of the petition upon OPC counsel." Rule 25(b), RLDD. The RLDD 
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also provide that "Except as otherwise provided in these rules, the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, . . . and the Utah Rules of Evidence apply in formal discipline 
actions . . . ." Rule 17(a), RLDD. Moreover, the rules provide that service of all 
papers other than formal complaints and disability petitions "shall be made in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Rule 14(b), RLDD. 
Schwenke's Verified Petition was the initial pleading in this action.12 (R. 1-
37) As such, it functions as the document that initiates of commences the action 
and invokes the jurisdiction of the District Court. The OPC, as the other party, 
must be served to bring it within the District Court's jurisdiction. As the Court has 
explained in other, but equally apt, contexts, 
It is elemental that before a court can lawfully determine any rights 
it must not only be a court empowered by law to determine such 
rights, but it must have acquired jurisdiction or control over the 
subject of the particular action, and of the parties thereto, by and in 
the methods recognized or prescribed by law. It acquires its 
jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he comes into court invoking its 
action. It acquires jurisdiction of the subject of the particular action 
by the filing of the sufficient complaint or other proper pleading or 
petition. And it acquires jurisdiction of the defendant or party other 
than plaintiff by the lawful service upon it of proper legal process or 
by its voluntary appearance in the action and submission to the 
court's jurisdiction over it. 
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n v. Wooras, 93 P.2d 455, 461 (Utah 1939); see also 
Riches v. Hadlock. 15 P.2d 283, 291 (Utah 1932) (proper and sufficient petition 
or initial pleading of some kind must be filed to invoke judicial action); Hillvard v. 
District Court of Cache County, 249 P. 806, 809 (Utah 1926), concurring opinion 
of Straup, J., (initial pleading such as complaint, petition, or affidavit invokes 
action and confers jurisdiction); State ex rel. W.A. v. State, 2002 UT App. 72 fl 14 
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("In Utah, a litigant initiates an action through the filing of a complaint or a 
petition, and service of process upon the named defendants."). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that personal service upon a 
corporation or an unincorporated association is accomplished "by delivering a 
copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process, . . . " Utah R. Civ. Pro. 4(d)(1)(E). Alternatively, service may be made 
by mail "provided defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt." Id. at 4(e)(2)(B). 
Actual service is essential because the petition's filing triggers certain 
time-sensitive duties for the OPC. Pursuant to the RLDD, "At the time a 
respondent files a petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall 
publish a notice of the petition in the Utah Bar Journal. The notice shall inform 
members of the Bar about the application for reinstatement or readmission, and 
shall request that any individuals file notice of their opposition or concurrence 
with the district court within 30 days of the date of publication." The Utah Bar 
Journal is published ten times per year, and goes to press well in advance of its 
mailing date. This means that the OPC must have an opportunity to prepare and 
publish the notice, and Bar members have thirty days beyond the date of 
publication to respond. Sixty days is a bare minimum for doing this, but if the 
OPC has not actually been served with the petition, it cannot ensure meeting the 
12
 Schwenke paid a filing fee—something required at the commencement of an 
action but not, for example, to file a motion in an action already under way. 
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requirements of Rule 25. Personal service on OPC counsel13 is the only way to 
accomplish this. 
Personal service is also the only way that the OPC can meet its duty to 
"notify each complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that led to the 
respondent's suspension or disbarment that the respondent is applying for 
reinstatement or readmission, and shall inform each complainant that the 
complainant has 30 days from the date of mailing to raise objections to or to 
support the respondent's petition." Rule 25(d), RLDD. 
Although Schwenke alleges that requiring more than service upon the 
receptionist creates an unfair burden on litigants, this is not so. (Brief of 
Appellant at 20) At least one OPC counsel is usually in the Law and Justice 
Center during business hours and is ready to accept personal service of such a 
petition. Moreover, the OPC is willing to accept service and its counsel make 
themselves available by appointment to accept service. In other words, the OPC 
has never attempted to avoid service, and in connection with its duties under the 
RLDD, as well as its individual counsels' duties in connection with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, would never do so. 
Rule 25 also requires the OPC to respond to a Petition for Readmission. 
It provides, 'Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition for 
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either: (1) [stipulate to 
reinstatement or readmission]; or (2) file a written objection to the petition." Rule 
13
 The RLDD provide that "'OPC counsel' means counsel appointed by the Board 
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, and other counsel employed to assist 
appointed counsel." Rule 2(e), RLDD. There are five OPC counsel, consisting of 
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25(f). Although the word "receiving" in other contexts could encompass a wide 
range of means, given the language of subsection (c) of the same rule, the 
petition must be served. 
Although the Verified Petition was never personally served upon OPC 
counsel, in the interests of justice and expediting these proceedings, the OPC 
nevertheless proceeded to notify Bar members and the complainants, and to 
respond pursuant to the RLDD. The OPC filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Verified Petition on August 31, 2001—sixty days after the date on which OPC 
counsel received the Verified Petition; sixty-three days after it was delivered to 
the Utah Law and Justice Center among a stack of other documents intended for 
the Admissions department. (R. 328-416) During that sixty-day interval, the 
OPC undertook its other responsibilities of notification. 
The OPC met its obligations under Rule 25 in a timely fashion. If it did 
not, its error resulted in a mere three-day delay, and this was harmless, 
particularly in view of the absence of a right to reply—a disbarred respondent has 
no further step to be taken that is time-sensitive and triggered by the OPC filing 
an objection. Harmless errors will not support the relief Schwenke requests. 
See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996) ("'Harmless' errors are 
'errors which, although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, as 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'"). 
the Senior Counsel, who is appointed by the Board, and the Deputy Counsel and 
three Assistant Counsel, all employed to assist the Senior Counsel. 
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III. SCHWENKE DID NOT ADVANCE THE COURSE OF THESE 
PROCEEDINGS TO A HEARING, NOR HAS HE DEMONSTRATED 
HARM TO HIMSELF REQUIRING THE REMEDY OF EXCUSING HIM 
FROM SUCH A HEARING 
In the event that the OPC files an objection to a petition for readmission, 
"the district court shall, within 90 days of the filing of the petition, conduct a 
hearing " Rule 25(g), RLDD. Schwenke filed the Verified Petition on July 3, 
2001. (R. 1-37) The District Court set the hearing on October 24, 2001, which is 
approximately three weeks in excess of the ninety days set by the rule. (R. 749-
756) 
Nothing in the record demonstrates that Schwenke attempted to advance 
this case to a hearing in the District Court. Indeed, nothing in the record 
suggests that he objected to the timeliness of the hearing until the day of the 
hearing itself. Surely the onus is upon a disbarred respondent to take the lead in 
bringing the matter for hearing. Moreover, Schwenke has alleged no harm 
occasioned by the brief delay. 
In truth, however, the rule in its strict interpretation imposes a substantial, 
if not impossible, burden upon the District Court. A hearing may be conducted 
only if the OPC files an objection. See Rule 26(g). If no objection is filed, "the 
district court shall review the petition without a hearing." Id. Because of its duty 
to notify Bar members and complainants and their opportunity to respond within 
thirty days, the OPC cannot reasonably determine whether to file an objection 
until the sixty-day reply period is well under way. See Rule 25(f). If the OPC 
does not object, it must stipulate to the disbarred respondent's readmission, and 
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advise the respondent and the District Court thereof. See id. If it objects on the 
last day of the period set by the rule, the District Court has only thirty days left in 
which to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See id. This requires scheduling more 
than a small amount of time, and in the OPC's experience, is often difficult for the 
District Court to do. 
Additionally, strict adherence to the time limits set by Rule 25 conceivably 
produces an absurd result: if a hearing must be set within ninety days after a 
petition is filed, but the disbarred respondent delays serving it upon the OPC, the 
period during which the hearing must be held could expire before the OPC is 
even served with the petition. This makes no sense. 
In any event, the Court should consider what would be the appropriate 
remedy for the District Court conducting the hearing outside the ninety days set 
by Rule 25. Although the interests of the disbarred respondent deserve some 
consideration, and the rule presumably sets relatively short periods for the 
purpose of keeping the process moving, and avoiding leaving an applicant in 
limbo, the interests of protecting the public and the integrity of the profession are 
paramount. The remedy for a delayed hearing on a petition for readmission 
should not be no hearing at all; it should be a hearing held as soon as possible. 
Shortly after the period specified by the rule, Schwenke had an opportunity to 
present evidence supporting his Verified Petition for Readmission and declined to 
14
 The OPC did not so stipulate in this case, nor did it advise the court or 
Schwenke that it would. Schwenke could therefore reasonably assume that an 
objection would be forthcoming. 
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do so. Under these circumstances, Schwenke's proposed remedies should be 
denied.15 
IV. SCHWENKE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED 
As Schwenke's Statement of the Issues Presented noted, the 
constitutional issues raised in his brief were not "specifically raised below." (Brief 
of Appellant at 3, 4) Because the issues were not raised, the District Court 
therefore had no opportunity to address them. Schwenke's contention as to each 
issue that it "is clearly present under the undisputed procedural facts and the fact 
the Appellant is a member of a protected class" is not a legitimate "statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." There is 
no reason why these issues could not have been properly raised, briefed, and 
argued for decision by the District Court. Moreover, Schwenke's statement that 
"This is a significant constitutional questions [sic] that affects or jeopardizes 
Appellant's liberty and property rights" lacks support in the case law. The Court 
therefore need not decide these issues. See Brookside Mobile Home Park v. 
Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14 (to preserve issue for appeal, it must be presented to 
trial court in such a way that trial court has opportunity to rule on it). The OPC 
nevertheless responds to these issues in the event the Court elects to consider 
them. 
Schwenke suggests that the application of the requirements of the RGA 
instead of Rule 25 of the RLDD violated his rights of equal protection and due 
15
 Ironically, Schwenke proposes that the case be remanded for findings without 
a hearing. Given that he declined to present evidence, the relief he requests is 
nearly the actual result in the District Court. 
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process because he was "subjected to a different admissions procedure than 
from other similarly situated applicants." (Brief of Appellant at 3) Further, he 
contends that he was denied due process "when he was subjected to a higher 
standard for ethical qualifications." (Brief of Appellant at 3) The constitutional 
issues will be addressed separately; Schwenke has not, however, identified 
others whom he contends were treated differently than he was treated. 
A. Schwenke's Due Process Rights Were Not Violated 
Due process consists of two aspects: procedural and substantive. 
Procedural due process guarantees a person fair procedures. Substantive due 
process protects a person's property from unfair governmental interference or 
taking. Schwenke's contention that he was subjected to a different standard than 
other applicants and subjected to different procedures suggests that his 
argument goes to alleged deprivation of procedural due process. 
The Due Process Clause imposes constraints on governmental decisions 
that deprive individuals of "property" interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause. See Arnovick, 2002 UT 71, fl 16. 
Determining the due process required in a given situation 
demands that we weigh: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probably 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridqe. 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)). 
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The Court recently noted, with respect to the first factor in connection with 
another admissions case involving the bar examination, that the Bar's decision 
did not permanently deny the petitioners the ability to practice law in Utah. Id. 
This analysis applies in Schwenke's case, too. When Schwenke has taken more 
substantial steps to meet the criteria set forth in the RGA, he may apply again 
and perhaps prevail. Thus, although his private interest in being readmitted to 
the practice of law is not negligible, neither is it permanently foreclosed. 
With respect to the second factor, there is little risk through the procedures 
used of an erroneous deprivation of Schwenke's interest in the practice of law. 
Schwenke submitted his application with supporting data; it was investigated and 
reviewed by the Character and Fitness Committee; upon the denial of his 
application, Schwenke was afforded a formal review, consistent with the RGA. 
He also had the opportunity, which he did not pursue, of an appeal before the 
Board. Moreover, although the District Court receives and reviews the Character 
and Fitness Committee's report, it can order a disbarred respondent's 
readmission notwithstanding a negative recommendation from the committee if 
the circumstances warrant it. 
Given this extensive review process by different bodies, the risk of error 
appears small. Significantly, Schwenke declined to present evidence at trial in 
the District Court. This Court has declared in connection with a discipline case 
that "Inasmuch as petitioner was afforded this opportunity [to present evidence] 
but chose not to exercise it, he was not denied due process." In re Jones, 696 
P.2d 1215, 1215 (Utah 1985). 
31 
Moreover, given the thorough review a case receives, including the 
potential for review from this Court, the probable value of additional safeguards 
appears minimal. The fiscal and administrative costs of this case have already 
been considerable, and imposing additional procedures outweighs the benefit 
that any such procedures would provide. 
B. Schwenke's Right of Equal Protection Was Not Violated 
A state may not deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of 
the laws. In other words, persons under like circumstances must be given equal 
protection in the enjoyment of personal rights. In the absence of a fundamental 
right or a protected class, however, states may treat similarly situated people 
differently if a reasonable basis exists for doing so. See Arnovick. 2002 UT 71, fl 
14; see also In re Randolph-Seng, 669 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1983) (where no 
suspect class or fundamental right involved, a rational relationship must exist 
between petitioner's nonadmission and state's legitimate objectives). 
Although Schwenke in various portions of his brief contended that 
practicing law is a fundamental right, and that he belongs to a protected class,16 
he has offered no legal authority in support of either proposition. (Appellant's 
Brief at 25) Nor can he as to the alleged fundamental right to practice law. See 
In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1980) ("The right to practice law is not one 
of the inherent rights of every citizen, as is the right to carry on an ordinary trade 
or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who 
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character."). 
16
 Schwenke states that he is a member of a "race protected class," but does not 
identify how this is related to the legal analysis. (Brief of Appellant at 15) 
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Moreover, Schwenke has offered absolutely no evidence that he has been 
treated differently from other similarly situated disbarred respondents or that he 
has somehow been singled out. All such applicants must meet the same 
requirements that Schwenke must meet before they can be readmitted to the 
practice of law. Any applicant who fails to meet the standard is barred, either by 
the Character and Fitness Committee, or by the District Court. 
Schwenke belongs to a class of disbarred respondents. Some disbarred 
respondents are readmitted; some are not. The State has a reasonable basis for 
establishing high criteria for readmitting disbarred respondents. After all, 
disbarred respondents are people who have demonstrated their lack of fitness to 
practice, and accordingly must establish more than a first-time applicant is 
required to establish. So long as the readmission criteria are applied to all such 
disbarred respondent applicants, and Schwenke has offered no evidence that 
they were not, the criteria are not a violation of the equal protection clause. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE 
Schwenke has misinterpreted the meaning of the separation of powers 
clause. The Supreme Court's regulation of the practice of law is not only not in 
violation of the separation of powers clause, but is entirely consistent therewith. 
The Constitution of Utah ("the Constitution") divides the power of the state 
government. It provides: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of 
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the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1 . 
The Utah Supreme Court elaborated upon the meaning of this section in 
an 1899 case: 
The legislative power was vested exclusively in the Legislature, and 
it is within its sphere to make the laws for the government of the 
State. The power to execute the laws was referred to the executive 
department, and the power to declare what are the laws, to the 
judiciary. The departments are all upon the same plane, all are 
coordinate branches of the same government, each absolute within 
its sphere, except as limited or controlled by the constitution of this 
State or of the United States. The apportionment of distinct power 
to one department of itself implies an inhibition against its exercise 
by either of the other departments. 
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 57 P. 1, 5 (Utah 1899) (emphasis added). 
But as the Supreme Court has noted, the separation of powers doctrine is 
not an exclusive apportionment of power to each of the departments. 
[The separation of powers doctrine] does not mean, as some 
suppose, that all power, executive, judicial or legislative in 
character must be exercised exclusively by the executive, judicial 
and legislative departments, respectively. If this were so 
government would be impossible. . . . It can only mean that there 
are certain powers so inherently legislative, executive, or judicial in 
character that they must be exercised exclusively by their 
respective departments. 
Taylor v. Lee. 226 P.2d 531, 537 (Utah 1951) (quoting 3 Mich. L Rev. 341 
(1905)). The Court added, 
In the light of these principles, we believe that what the members 
of the Constitutional Convention intended when they spoke of the 
powers properly belonging to each department were those powers 
which were so inherently legislative, executive or judicial in 
character that they must be exercised exclusively by their 
respective departments. 
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Tavlor v.Lee. 226 P.2d 531, 537 (Utah 1951). 
That the power to regulate the practice of law belongs inherently to the 
Court is reinforced by the fact that the Constitution does not confer upon the 
Legislative department any part of the regulation of the practice of law. Although 
Article VIII, pertaining to the Judicial Department, affords the Legislature 
considerable authority over some matters relating to the judicial branch of 
government, it does not give it any power over admission or discipline of 
attorneys. 
The Constitution of Utah vests the Utah Supreme Court with the authority 
to regulate the practice of law through its rule-making powers. See Utah Const. 
Art. VIII, § 4. This section was added to the Constitution through an amendment 
effective July 1, 1985 that ratified the Court's power to regulate the practice of 
law. Prior to the 1985 amendment, the Court had inherent authority that flowed 
from the Constitution. See In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes 
in Rules on Adver.. 647 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1982) (the Court's authority to act 
on petition stems from judicial power conferred by Constitution, inherent in which 
is power to regulate practice of law); In re Davis. 754 P.2d 63, 65 n.6 (Utah 
1986). As the Court explained shortly after the amendment expressly conferred 
the power, the Court had Constitutionally-conferred inherent power, and although 
the Legislature has some power to regulate attorneys, at least in certain 
respects, the power is subject to the Court's inherent power to discipline 
attorneys. See In re McCune. 717 P.2d 701, 704-705 (Utah 1986); see also In re 
CrandalL 784 P.2d 1193, 1195 n.2 (Utah 1989); Barnard v. Utah State Bar. 804 
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P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1991); Bailey v. Utah State Bar. 846 P.2d 1278, 1280-1281 
(Utah 1993). 
The Court's opinions since the 1985 amendment demonstrate its view that 
its power to regulate the practice of law in Utah is an exclusive power. See Utah 
State Bar v. Summerhaves & Havden, 905 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah 1995) 
(characterizing Court's authority as "exclusive"); Schwenke v. Smith. 942 P.2d 
335, 336 (Utah 1997) (Court is "sole authority" in these matters). This accords 
with opinions from other jurisdictions. See ag. In re Patton. 519 P.2d 288, 290 
(N.M. 1974) ("Unquestionably, the regulation of the practice of law is the 
exclusive constitutional prerogative of this Court."); See also Board of Comm'rs v. 
Peterson. 937 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1997). 
In some areas that need not be elaborated upon here, the Constitution 
explicitly charges the Legislature with certain responsibilities and elsewhere 
permits it discretionary authority in connection with the judicial department. The 
Constitution does not, however, allocate to the Legislature any authority over the 
regulation of the practice of law; that is the province of the Supreme Court. 
In the early 1900s, the Legislature provided for admission to practice law, 
attorney discipline, and disbarment. See Barnard Utah State Bar. 804 P.2d 526, 
528 (Utah 1991). In 1917, the Legislature also granted authority to the Utah 
Supreme Court to establish rules for admission and discipline. See id- Prior to 
1931, the Bar was a private, voluntary organization, but in 1931, the Legislature 
officially recognized the Utah State Bar and required lawyers to be members and 
to pay a licensing fee into a fund for use by the Bar. See id. The 1931 Act 
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authorized the Bar to recommend admission and discipline to the Supreme Court 
for binding action. See id. The Act also required Court approval of the Bar's 
rules and regulations before becoming final. See id. 
Nevertheless, the Court has always regulated the practice of law pursuant 
to its inherent judicial power. See Barnard, 804 P.2d at 528. In other words, the 
statutory authority conferred on the Court is in addition to its inherent power, 
which has existed from the beginning. See id. Indeed, the Legislature formally 
recognized the Supreme Court's inherent judicial power in the 1931 Act, which 
provided that nothing in it "'limited or altered the powers of the courts to disbar or 
discipline members of the bar.'". See id. (quoting Rev. Stat, of Utah § 6-0-18 
(1933)); see also In re McCune. 717 P.2d 701, 704-705 (Utah 1986) (statutes 
regarding attorney discipline did not and do not "in any way limit or alter the 
power of the courts to discipline or disbar members of the Bar."). 
The Court's regulation of the practice of law with respect to admissions 
and discipline is therefore not a violation of the separation of powers. Moreover, 
although the clause may indeed in a larger sense serve to protect individual 
liberties, it does not operate in the manner Schwenke suggests. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence does not demonstrate a fundamental change in Schwenke's 
character, and falls far short of the guaranty that there will be no repetition of his 
prior misconduct. Restoring Schwenke to the practice of law would be harmful to 
the administration of justice and would lower confidence in the integrity of the 
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profession. It is simply not compatible at this time with the public interest, and 
the remedies he requests therefore should be denied. 
DATED: November M . 2002. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Kate A. Toomey ] 
Deputy Counsel 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 4 ~K day of M w f iViViv. 2002,1 caused to 
be mailed via United States mail, first class postage pre-paid, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to: 
A. Paul Schwenke 
P.O. Box 3623 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3623 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule Six, Character & Fitness, Rules Governing Admission to the Utah State Bar 
Rule Fourteen, Readmission after Resignation or Disbarment, Rules Governing 
Admission to the Utah State Bar 
Rule 25. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months; 
readmission; Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability 
Certified letter from Utah State Bar to Schwenke dated May 29, 2001 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the Character and 
Fitness Committee dated August 10, 2001 
Minutes Law & Motion dated October 24, 2001 
Order: Denying Respondent's Motion to Strike OPC's Opposition and to Strike 
OPC's Discovery; Denying Petitioner's Motion to Strike Hearing; Denying OPC's 
Motion in Limine; Denying OPC's Motion to Compel; Denying Petitioner's Verified 
Petition for Readmission dated November 19, 2001 
RULE SIX 
Character & Fitness 
Section 6-1. Standard of Character and Fitness. An attorney's conduct should 
conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the 
attorney's business and personal affairs. An attorney should be one whose record of conduct 
justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional duties 
owed to them. An applicant whose record manifests a significant deficiency in honesty, 
trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability shall be denied admission. Applicants must be approved 
by the Character and Fitness Committee and then approved by the Board prior to sitting for the 
Bar Examination. 
Section 6-2. The Investigative Process; Investigation Panel Interviews. Investigations 
into the character and fitness of applicants may be informal, but shall be thorough, with the 
object of ascertaining the truth. 
(a). The Character and Fitness Committee may conduct an investigation and 
may act with or without requiring a personal appearance by an applicant. 
(b). At the discretion of the Character and Fitness Committee, an applicant 
may be required to attend an investigation panel interview conducted, by 
no fewer than three (3) members of the Committee. The investigation 
panel interview shall be informal but the applicant shall have the right to 
counsel and shall be notified by mail of the general factual axeas of 
inquiry. Documentary evidence may be provided to the Character and 
Fitness panel but no witnesses will be permitted to appear during the 
interview. The interview shall be a closed proceeding. 
(c). After an investigation panel interview has been conducted the Character 
and Fitness Committee shall promptly notify the applicant that he or she 
has been approved to sit for the Bar Examination or notify the applicant by 
mail that the applicant has been denied and set iprth generally the reasons 
for denial. 
Section 6-3. Formal Hearing; Applicant's Request. In matters where the Character 
and Fitness Committee determines that an investigation panel interview is unnecessary, or in 
cases where an applicant has been denied admission by an investigation panel as outlined in this 
Rule, the Character and Fitness Committee shall hold a formal hearing pursuant to an applicant's 
request as set forth below. The formal hearing shall be a closed proceeding and may be 
scheduled whether or not preceded by a panel interview. A decision after a formal hearing is a 
prerequisite to appeal under the provisions below. 
(a). If an applicant has been denied admission as outlined above, an applicant may 
within twenty (20) days of notice of the decision by the investigation panel 
request a formal hearing. The request must be made in writing and provided to 
the Bar's Admission Administrator. 
(b). Notice of the formal hearing shall be given at least ten (10) days before the 
hearing via mail and shall include a statement of the preliminary factual matters 
of concern constituting the grounds for denial. The names of persons who 
provide information adverse to the applicant which was in whole or in part a basis 
for the denial shall be disclosed in the notice. 
(c). A formal hearing shall be a de novo proceeding attended by no fewer than five (5) 
but no more than thirteen (13) Character and Fitness Committee members. The 
applicant has the burden of proof to establish his or her requisite character and 
fitness to practice law by clear and convincing evidence. 
(d). The formal hearing will have a complete stenographic record made by a certified 
court reporter or an electronic record made by means acceptable in the courts of 
the State of Utah. All testimony shall be taken under oath. Although no formal 
rules of evidence or civil procedure will apply, an applicant has the right to 
counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, examine all evidence and the right 
to present witnesses and documentary evidence. An applicant is entitled to make 
reasonable use of the Board's subpoena powers to compel attendance of witnesses 
and to adduce relevant evidence relating to matters adverse to the applicant. 
(e). Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law should be issued no later than 
forty-five (45) days after the formal hearing and subsequent briefings, if any. 
Section 6-4 Factors Related to Character and Fitness. In addition to the standards set 
forth in Rules 6-1 and 6-5 the Character and Fitness Committee Board decides may use the 
following factors to decide whether an applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness to 
practice law: 
(a). the applicant's lack of candor 
(b). unlawful conduct 
(c). academic misconduct 
(d). making of false or misleading statements, including omissions 
(e). misconduct in employment 
(f). acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation 
(g). abuse of legal process 
(h). neglect of financial responsibilities 
(i). neglect of professional obligations 
(j). violation of an order of a court 
(k). evidence of mental or emotional instability 
(1). evidence of drug or alcohol dependency 
(m). denial of admission to the bar in another jurisdiction on character and fitness 
grounds 
(n). past or pending disciplinary action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other 
professional disciplinary agency of any jurisdiction 
(o). other conduct bearing upon character or fitness to practice law 
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In making this determination through the processes described above, the following 
factors should be considered in assigning weight and significance to prior conduct: 
(p). the applicant's age at the time of conduct 
(q). the recency of the conduct 
(r). the reliability of the information concerning the conduct 
(s). the seriousness of the conduct 
(t). the factors underlying the conduct 
(u). the cumulative effect of conduct or information 
(v). the evidence of rehabilitation 
(w). the applicant's positive social contributions since the conduct 
(x). the applicant's candor in the admissions process 
(y). the materiality of any omission or misrepresentations 
Section 6-5. Criminal Conduct; Parole, Probation and Supervised Release. 
1. An applicant convicted of a misdemeanor offense or who has entered a plea in 
abeyance to any criminal offense may be asked to appear before members of the 
Character and Fitness Committee for an investigation panel interview or a formal 
hearing. In determining whether the applicant is of good character, the 
Committee will consider the nature and seriousness of the criminal conduct 
resulting in the conviction(s), mitigating and aggravating factors including 
completion of terms and conditions of any sentence imposed and demonstration 
of clearly proven rehabilitation. 
2. A rebuttable presumption exists against admission of an applicant convicted of a 
felony offense. For purposes of this rule, a conviction includes entry of a nolo 
contendre (no contest) plea. An applicant who has been convicted of a felony 
offense is not eligible to apply for admission until after the date of completion of 
any sentence, term of probation or term of parole or supervised release whichever 
occurred last. Upon an applicant's eligibility, a formal«hearing as set forth in 
these Rules before members of the Character and Fitness Committee will be held. 
Factors to be considered by the Committee include, but are not limited to, the 
nature and seriousness of the criminal conduct resulting in the conviction(s), 
mitigating and aggravating factors including completion of terms and conditions 
of a sentence imposed and demonstration of clearly proven rehabilitation. 
Section 6-6. Appeals from Final Denial; Applicant's Request Applicants have the 
right to appeal a final decision made after a formal hearing as set forth in these Rules. An 
applicant must file a written request to the Board of Bar Commissioners with the Bar's 
Admissions Administrator within twenty (20) days of the date of notice of denial. A pre-
determined panel of three (3) Board of Bar Commissioners win conduct a formal review of the 
final decision. The appeal hearing shall be a closed proceeding and will be limited to 
consideration of the record produced in the formal hearing. Oral argument will be held at the 
discretion of the appeal panel and only if such is deemed necessary. 
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(a). The decision after the formal hearing shall be affirmed if there is substantial and 
credible evidence to support it. 
(b). Applicants will be responsible for payment and obtaining a duly certified copy of 
the transcript of the formal hearing proceedings or other electronic record copy as 
described in Rule 6-3 (c). 
(c). The appeal hearing panel shall within thirty (30) days after the complete formal 
review issue a written decision. 
Section 6-7. Reapplication After Denial. Following the final decision, which includes 
the appellate decision if one was issued, re-application may be made after one year from the date 
of the decision unless a different time period was specified in writing. 
Section 6-8. Confidentiality; Exceptions, and Due Process. All records, documents, 
and sources relating to the admissions process shall not be disclosed other than to the applicant 
and the applicant's attorney and to Committee members, admissions staff, the Bar's General 
Counsel, members of the Bar Commission who serve on appeals panels and in appropriate cases, 
the Bar's Office of Professional Conduct as contemplated by these Rules. Confidential 
information includes, but is not limited to the application and supporting documents including 
letters of recommendation, reports and documents from other associations, agencies, employers, 
and courts of law. Confidential information in some instances may be disclosed under Rule 6-10. 
Section 6-9. Communications Relating to Applications. 
Letters or information relating to an applicant in which the writer requests confidentiality 
are to be held confidential and not placed in evidence or otherwise made available to the 
decision-making body or anyone else involved in a decision-making capacity with respect to the 
admission of the applicant. Any such body or person having knowledge of the content of the 
information, including members of the Board, shall withdraw from participation in the matter, 
and if necessary, the Board shall appoint persons necessary to replace those required to withdraw 
from the decision-making process. 
Section 6-10. Release of Information. Except as otherwise authorized by order of the 
Utah Supreme Court, the Bar or the Character and Fitness Committee shall deny requests for 
confidential information but may grant the request only if made by: 
(a). An entity authorized to investigate the qualifications of persons for admission to 
practice law; or 
(b). An agency or entity authorized to investigate the qualifications of persons for 
government employment; or 
(c). A lawyer discipline enforcement agency; or 
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(d). An agency or entity authorized to investigate the qualifications of judicial 
candidates. 
If the request is granted, information shall be released only upon certification by the 
requesting agency or entity that the confidential information shall be used for authorized 
purposes only. If one of the above-enumerated entities requests confidential information, the 
Character and Fitness Committee or the Bar shall give written notice to the applicant that the 
confidential information will be disclosed within ten (10) days unless the applicant obtains an 
order from the Supreme Court restraining such disclosure. 
RuleSixC.Doc. 
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RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Rule Fourteen, Readmission after Resignation or Disbarment 
Section 14-2. Readmission after Disbarment. An applicant for 
readmission to the Bar after disbarment shall satisfy all requirements of Rule 3 as 
stated above, and shall satisfy all other requirements imposed by the Supreme 
Court. 
RULES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY 
Rule 25. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months; 
readmission. 
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a 
disbarred respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the 
district court. No respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months 
before the period for suspension has expired. No respondent may petition for 
readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A respondent 
who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same 
misconduct that was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for 
readmission at the expiration of five years from the effective date of the interim 
suspension. 
(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified, 
filed with the district court, and shall specify with particularity the manner in which 
the respondent meets each of the criteria specified in paragraph (e) or, if not, 
why there is otherwise good and sufficient reason for reinstatement or 
readmission. Unless abated by the district court, the petition must be 
accompanied by an advance cost deposit in the amount set from time to time by 
the Board of Commissioners to cover anticipated costs of the proceeding. Prior to 
or as part of the respondent's petition, the respondent may request modification 
or abatement of conditions of discipline, reinstatement or readmission. 
(c) Service of petition. The respondent shall serve a copy of the petition 
upon OPC counsel. 
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time a respondent files a petition 
for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall publish a notice of the 
petition in the Utah Bar Journal. The notice shall inform members of the Bar 
about the application for reinstatement or readmission, and shall request that any 
individuals file notice of their opposition or concurrence with the district court 
within 30 days of the date of publication. In addition, OPC counsel shall notify 
each complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that led to the respondent's 
suspension or disbarment that the respondent is applying for reinstatement or 
readmission, and shall inform each complainant that the complainant has 30 
days from the date of mailing to raise objections to or to support the respondent's 
petition. Notice shall be mailed to the last known address of each complainant in 
OPC counsel's records. 
(e) Criteria for reinstatement and readmission. A respondent may be 
reinstated or readmitted only if the respondent meets each of the following 
criteria, or, if not, presents good and sufficient reason why the respondent should 
nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted: 
(1) The respondent has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all 
prior disciplinary orders except to the extent they are abated by the district court. 
(2) The respondent has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment. 
(3) If the respondent was suffering from a physical or mental disability or 
impairment which was a causative factor of the respondent's misconduct, 
including substance abuse, the disability or impairment has been removed. 
Where substance abuse was a causative factor in the respondent's misconduct, 
the respondent shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless: 
(A) the respondent has recovered from the substance abuse as 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; 
(B) the respondent has abstained from the use of the abused substance 
and the unlawful use of controlled substances for the preceding six months; and 
(C) the respondent is likely to continue to abstain from the substance 
abused and the unlawful use of controlled substances. 
(4) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was disciplined, 
the respondent has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. In 
readmission cases, the respondent must appear before the Bar's Character and 
Fitness Committee and cooperate in its investigation of the respondent. A copy of 
the Character and Fitness Committee's report and recommendation shall be 
forwarded to the district court assigned to the petition. 
(5) The respondent has kept informed about recent developments in the 
law and is competent to practice. 
(6) In cases of suspensions for one year or more, the respondent shall be 
required to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. 
(7) In all cases of disbarment, the respondent shall be required to pass the 
student applicant bar examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination. 
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's 
petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either: 
(1) advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will 
stipulate to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or 
(2) file a written objection to the petition. 
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district 
court shall, within 90 days of the filing of the petition, conduct a hearing at which 
the respondent shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the respondent has met each of the criteria in paragraph (e) or, 
if not, that there is good and sufficient reason why the respondent should 
nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted. The district court shall enter its findings 
and order. If no objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court shall review 
the petition without a hearing and enter its findings and order. 
(h) Successive petitions. Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, no 
respondent shall apply for reinstatement or readmission within one year following 
an adverse judgment upon a petition for reinstatement or readmission. 
(i) Conditions of reinstatement or readmission. The district court may 
impose conditions on a respondent's reinstatement or readmission if the 
respondent has met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, 
but the district court reasonably believes that further precautions should be taken 
to ensure that the public will be protected upon the respondent's return to 
practice. 
(j) Reciprocal reinstatement or readmission. If a respondent has been suspended 
or disbarred solely on the basis of discipline imposed by another court, another 
jurisdiction, or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, and if the 
respondent is later reinstated or readmitted by that court, jurisdiction or 
regulatory body, the respondent may petition for reciprocal reinstatement or 
readmission in this state. The respondent shall file with the district court and 
serve upon OPC counsel a petition for reciprocal reinstatement or readmission, 
as the case may be. The petition shall include a certified or otherwise 
authenticated copy of the order of reinstatement or readmission from the other 
court, jurisdiction or regulatory body. Within 20 days of service of the petition, 
OPC counsel may file an objection thereto based solely upon substantial 
procedural irregularities. If an objection is filed, the district court shall hold a 
hearing and enter its findings and order. If no objection is filed, the district court 
shall enter its order based upon the petition. 
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May 29, 2001 
VIA CERTIFIED U.S. MAIL 
Mr. A. Paul Schwenke 
P.O. Box 3623 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3623 
RE: A. PAUL SCHWENKE APPLICATION FOR 
ADMISSION TO THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Dear Mr. Schwenke: 
After careful review of your application for admission to the Utah State 
Bar, the Bar's Character and Fitness Committee (the "Committee") has decided to 
deny your application to sit for the July 2001 Bar Examination. Rule 6-1 of the 
Rules Governing Admission to the Utah State Bar ("Rules"), provides: 
An attorney's conduct should conform to the 
requirements of the law, both in professional service 
to clients and in the attorney's business and personal 
affairs. An attorney should be one whose record of 
conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, 
courts, and others with respect to the professional 
duties owed to them. An applicant whose record 
manifests a significant deficiency in the honesty, 
trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability shall be 
denied admission. 
The Committee considered the following evidence to be relevant to its 
decision: theft of client funds, unsatisfied judgments; the numerous pending civil 
actions; neglect of financial responsibilities; and past arrests, including convictions 
for driving while intoxicated. 
Based on this past conduct, and taking into account the factors set forth in 
Rule 6-1 and 6-3, it is the decision of the Committee that you have failed to 
Utah §tateBar 
645 South 200 East • Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834 
Telephone 801-531-9077 • 1-800-698-9077 
FAX 801-531-0660 
www utahbar org 
establish a record of conduct that justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, 
and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them. The application 
demonstrates a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or 
reliability required of an applicant for the Utah State Bar. 
For further reference, copies of Rule Six and the Bar's Formal Hearing 
Information and Procedures are enclosed. IF YOU "WISH TO CHALLENGE 
THIS DECISION, A WRITTEN REQUEST FOR A FORMAL HEARING MUST 
BE FILED WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS 
NOTICE. Any such request should be submitted to me at the Utah State Bar. 
DATED this j ? f * W of v/)q*j , QOQ\ 
| N I DICKSON SEKO 
DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL/ADMISSIONS 
jds 
Enclosures 
UTAH STATE BAR 
CHARACTER AND FITNESS COMMITTEE 
In re: Application of ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. PAUL SCHWENKE ) AND RECOMMENDATION 
On June 2d;2001, A. Paul Schwenke ("Schwenke), without counsel, appeared 
before the Character and Fitness Committee of the Utah State Bar ("Committee") to 
consider his application for admission to the Utah State Bar ("Bar"). The Committee 
heard testimony from Schwenke and Caren Serr Bischel ("Bischel") and reviewed 
exhibits and other documentary information submitted by Schwenke and the Bar. 
Based upon the evidence submitted and the testimony given to the Committee, 
and after careful consideration and for good cause appearing, the Committee 
unanimously votes to deny Schwenke's application for admission to the Bar and now 
enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Schwenke was admitted to the Utah State Bar in 1983. 
2. Schwenke practiced law as an attorney until 1992. 
3. In 1987, a complaint was filed with the Office of Bar Counsel against 
Schwenke for the misappropriation of $100,000 in the course of setding client Caren Serr 
Bischel's personal injury case. Schwenke agreed to entry of judgment in the amount of 
$100,000, by Stipulation dated September 19,1989 ("Stipulated Judgment"), entered in 
the Third District Court case of Serr v. Schwenke and Bruce Udall, Civil Case No. 88-
01441. Schwenke confessed to a judgment in fraud, non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, in 
the sum of $100,000, less certain credits for prior payment to Ms. Bischel and the value 
of proceeds from two parcels of real property. See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommendation for Discipline dated April 20,1992, \ 18, Hearing Exhibit D. 
4. The $100,000 Stipulated Judgment entered by the Third District Court in 
Serr v. Schwenke apd Udall, was based upon fraud which included damages for ths loss 
of the money necessary for Ms. Bischel to have rehabilitative surgery, loss of future 
earnings, emotional distress, punitive damages, costs and attorneys fees. See, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation for Discipline dated April 20,1992, ^  
22, Hearing Exhibit D. 
5. On March 2, 1992, a hearing was held to consider the allegations against 
Schwenke. The hearing panel recommended that Schwenke be disbarred. The panel 
further recommended that Schwenke pay restitution to Bischel in the amount of $97,250. 
On August 10,1992, the Board of Bar Commissioners affirmed the hearing panel's 
recommendations. Schwenke's appeal from the entry of the Order of Discipline was 
denied by the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed the order of disbarment and payment 
of restitution in a decision entered on December 1,1993. In re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1993), aff^d Schwenke v. Smith, No. 960255 (Utah July 8,1997). 
6. Since the date of entry of the Stipulated Judgment in 1989, Ms. Bischel 
received a nominal amount of money from a set-off of payments made prior to entry of 
the judgment After unsuccessfully attempting to satisfy the judgment, Ms. Bischel 
assigned the Stipulated Judgment to a third party for $10,000. The Stipulated Judgment 
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was subsequently satisfied to the benefit of the third party from the proceeds of the 
foreclosure sale of Schwenke's residence. 
7. However, as of the date June 26,2001, Ms. Bischel had not received any 
other direct payment from Schwenke. Ms. Bischel has not been able to obtain the 
medical treatment and therapy she needs to correct the damage she suffered as a result of 
the underlying accident from which Schwenke misdirected the setdement funds;. 
Schwenke has not attempted to repay Ms. Bischel and did not express any remorse for 
her circumstances that are a direct result of his dishonest actions. 
8. Schwenke tesd&ed that the Stipulated Judgment had been fully satisfied. 
June 26,2001, Hearing Transcript (herein after Hearing Transcript), p. 19:22-24 ("And 
probably more importantly, the judgment itself for 100,000 some dollars has been fully 
satisfied."). Despite having been informed of the Committee's concern about his prior 
theft of client funds and the Supreme Court's Order affirming that restitution should be 
paid to Ms. Bischel, Schwenke has not demonstrated the diligence and reliability required 
of an attorney by seeking to rectify the damage caused by his wrongful acts. Furthermore, 
Schwenke expressed no remorse for the damages suffered by Bischel and referred only to 
the "heartaches and whatnot" Schwenke had experienced since being disbarred. Hearing 
Transcript, p. 107:3. Under the facts of this case, the Committee finds that Schwenke's 
testimony that he has accepted blame for the incident involving Ms. Bischel that lead to 
his eventual disbarment is not credible. 
9. The Application for the Utah Bar Examination and Admission to the Utah 
3 
State Bar ("Bar Application") completed by Schwenke indicates that he is currently self-
employed and has been self-employed since 1995. The Bar Application omits any 
reference to the nature of Schwenke's self-employment other than describing his 
responsibilities as "management" and that he has "no partners." Hearing Exhibit B. In 
an attachment to the Bar Application, Schwenke indicated that he was self-employed in 
real estate investment projects. He conducted business since 1995 using the following 
entities: Kristol Management & Investment, Inc., Murray Development Company, Pacific 
Investment, Bonneville Investment Group, LLC, Deer Creek Parcel One, LLC, and B&B, 
LLC. 
10. During the course of the June 26, 2001, hearing, it became apparent that 
Schwenke has been in a variety of partnership-like ventures with a person identified as 
Ken Davis. Hearing Transcript, p. 47:1. Schwenke and Mr. Davis "go out and try to find 
a deal and try to put deals together." Hearing Transcript, p. 46: 21-22. Despite being on 
notice of the Committee's concern regarding Schwenke's financial history, Schwenke 
failed, either through omission or evasive statements, to provide the Committee with a 
complete and accurate description of his business dealings. 
11. Schwenke receives no formal wage from the partnership-like ventures and 
does not appear to have any reliable source of financial support. However, Schwenke 
derives an ownership interest in real property and other assets acquired by the 
partnership-like entities in which he claims an equitable interest. Schwenke receives 
distributions from the partnership-like entities upon sale of such assets or advances from 
Ken Davis as the need arises. 
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12. Schwenke also testified that he either receives advances from Ken Davis 
or distributions from the partnership-like entities in the approximate amount of $50,000 
annually. Hearing Transcript p. 60:8. Yet, Schwenke also testified that he does not 
report that income to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Hearing Transcript, p. 60:5. 
Despite being on notice of the Committee's concern regarding Schwenke's financial 
history, Schwenkejfailed, either through omission or evasive statements, to provide the 
Committee with a complete and accurate description of his business dealings. 
Schwenke's conduct demonstrates a disregard for the law and involves acts of 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and abuse of the legal process. 
13. Sometime between 1993 and prior to 1995, Schwenke received a 
distribution of approximately $1.5 million from the sale of assets of a bankrupt 
corporation named Diamond C Holding, Inc. Hearing Transcript, pp. 35-36. Another 
principal of Diamond C Holding, Thomas Waldron, served a sentence in Federal prison 
for fraud related to the his employment at Diamond C Holdings, Inc. 
14. Although Schwenke admitted to personally receiving approximately $1.5 
million sometime prior to 1995, Mr. Schwenke used no portion of the sale proceeds to 
pay any portion of the debt he owed to Ms. Bischel. 
15. Although Schwenke admitted to personally receiving approximately $1.5 
million sometime prior to 1995, Mr. Schwenke used no portion of the sale proceeds to 
pay a student loan debt in which the creditor had to resort to collection by civil 
complaint 
16. Although Schwenke admitted to personally receiving approximately $1.5 
5 
million jonietinie pnui il l'>*h, uicliwenki used no [loitiuri I (lie s*i!r pincped < hi \id\ 
outstanding tax liens of approximately $1,000,000 levied in approximately 1994. The 
currer' 1l! alance on the 
Schwenke testified that since the date of entry of the IRS tax liens, he has 
conducted his financial affairs on a cash-only basis. Based on the cumulative effect of 
Schwenke's condijct and the information provided at the hearing, the Committee finds 
that Schwenke*s purpose for conducting his financial affairs on a cash-only basis is to 
frustrate the collection effort of the IRS. Schwenke's conduct demonstrates a disregard 
for the law and involves acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and abuse of 
the legal process, 
18 Schwenke also testified that he has not filed tax returns with either the IRS 
or the Utah State Tax Commission since 1996. Schwenke's conduct demonstrates a 
disregard for the law and involves acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and 
abuse of the legal process. 
19 Schwenke also testified that he currently resides in a home located in 
Kanosh, Utah. The Kanosh home is the subject of a pending civil lawsuit wherein 
Schwenke is a named defendant. Bank One, N.A. v. Schwenke, et al, Case No. 
000402249, Fourth District Court, Utah County, Utah. It is apparent that the home 
constitutes bank-owned property and, based on the evasive answer provided to the 
question of whether Schwenke has permission to occupy the residence and the pending 
eviction action referenced above, the Committee concludes that he does not Hearing 
Iranscnpl p h?'K Srhvvnikrv' niinim I dt.'iiioiLslralir' a disregard for the l.ns mil 
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involves acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and abuse of the legal 
process. 
20. Schwenke testified that he is named as a party defendant in no less than 
seven civil actions pending in Utah state courts involving allegations of fraud and 
misrepresentation. Schwenke testified that he recently entered into a confession of 
judgment for approximately $18,000 to $20,000 in a case entitled Winterton v. Schwenke, 
Case No. 010900757, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah. Schwenke describes 
the nature of the complaint as a breach of an unsecured promissory note. 
21. In response to Question 22 on the Bar Application completed by 
Schwenke, he indicated that he filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code in 1985 and further added that "[s]ince then I have not been sued 
by a receiver, trustee, etc." Hearing Exhibit B. 
22. Contrary to the information voluntarily provided by Schwenke in response 
to Question 22, Schwenke filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code in the District of Utah on November 11, 1990, Case No. 90C-27133. 
This case was later dismissed with prejudice as to refiling by order dated April 2,1991. 
Schwenke omitted any reference to Case No. 90C-27133 on the Bar Application. Despite 
being on notice of the Committee's concern regarding Schwenke's financial history, 
Schwenke failed, either through omission or evasive statements, to provide the 
Committee with a complete and accurate description of his personal finances and 
business dealings. 
23. Contrary to the information voluntarily provided by Schwenke in response 
7 
to Question 22, Schwenke, as a managing member and principal, executed a petition for 
relief under Chapter 7 on behalf of Bonneville Investment Group, LLC, on June 27,2000, 
Case No. OOC-27213. Contrary to the statement that Schwenke had "not been sued by a 
receiver, trustee etc ," the Chapter 7 Trustee was compelled to file a Motion to Designate 
"Debtors" under Rule 9001 because the Debtor, Bonneville Investment Group, LLC, 
concerning the financial affairs of the Debtor. By order dated November 20,2000, the 
mill designated Sdiwcnki0 niitoiiu, nlhris »ts ,i iJcblm with ill I he duties inn! 
responsibilities of a debtor in bankruptcy. The statement contained in the Bar 
Despite being on notice of the Committee's concern regarding Schwenke's financial 
Committee with a complete and accurate description of his personal finances and 
:•• dealings. Sthnciike > i oiidm I dtiiioitslMlc » a Licl d LJiidoi a disici'.ird toi 1 tit1 
law and involves acts of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and abuse of the 
legal piuirsft. • . . 
24. Since 1987, Schwenke has been arrested on three separate occasions for 
driving while intuxieatal Sdivvaike h.i.i iit4 been i i nun/led I dnyini' undei Ihic 
influence. Schwenke does not believe that he has a drinking problem. Hearing 
Transcript, p 10 4:11. 
25. Schwenke's Utah vehicle operator's license was suspended on August 15, 
8 
2000, and remains suspended. When asked whether he has a current driver's license, 
Schwenke replied: "I believe I do, but..." Hearing Transcript, p. 103:24. Schwenke's 
implication either through misrepresentation or omission or evasive statements 
demonstrates a lack of candor and disregard for the law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Thextecision of the Character and Fitness Committee is governed by the 
Supreme Court-approved "Rules Governing Admission to the Utah State Bar" ("Rules"). 
2. Rule 6-1 of above-named Rules provides: 
An attorney's conduct should conform to the requirements of the 
law, both in professional service to clients and in the attorney's 
business and personal affairs. An attorney should be one whose 
record of conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, 
and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them. 
An applicant whose record manifests a significant deficiency in 
trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability shall be denied admission. 
3. An applicant bears the burden to establish his/her requisite character and 
fitness to practice law by clear and convincing evidence. Formal Hearing Information 
and Procedures for Admission to the Utah State Bar. Thus Schwenke must establish that 
he is possessed of good moral character and entitled to the high regard and confidence of 
the public, and must remove any and all reasonable suspicions of moral unfitness. 
4. Rule 6-4 provides the factors that the Committee may consider to 
determine whether an applicant possesses the requisite character and fitness to practice 
law and lists specific factors that should be considered in mitigation of an applicant's 
conduct 
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5. The Comnuftee 'weighed nil the re I '\\uit cnifena and applied the Lielors 
related to the requisite character and fitness to practice law in the State of Utah listed in 
• Sea. •. .) through (o) Based 0:1 1 the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Committee 
unanimously concludes that Schwenke's conduct since his disbarment and his lack of 
candor and failure to accurately and thoroughly complete the Bar Application 
demonstrates serious deficiencies regarding (a) lack of candor, (b) unlawful conduct, (c 
making of false or misleading statements, including omissions regarding the Bar 
Application, (d) acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, (g) abuse 
of legal process, (h) neglect of financial responsibilities, (i) neglect of professional 
obligations associated with repaying Ms. Bischel, and (n) past or pending disciplinary 
action by a lawyer disciplinary agency or other professional disciplinary agency of any 
jurisdiction. 
6 In making this determination, the Committee also considered the factors 
listed in Rule 6-4 (p) through (y) including Schwenke's positive soci al contribution s 
since the conduct that lead to his disbarment. The Committee gave serious consideration 
and appropriate weight to Schwenke's assertion that his attempt to be readmitted to the 
practice of law was motivated in large part by what Schwenke perceives to be a lack of 
adequate legal representation for members of the Polynesian community in Utah. 
However, the Committee weighed that one assertion against Schwenke's lack of candor 
in the admission protr / l u l iil'midf IKT of rehabilitation Ihf-1 sermusness ol his prior 
misconduct and failure to pay restitution, the materiality of his omissions and 
misrepresentations, and the cumulative effect of the "ondtict and information gathered 
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during the course of the hearing and the evaluation process, and unanimously finds 
Schwenke completely and utterly failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he 
should be readmitted to the Bar. 
RECOMMENDATION 
BASED upon these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Committee 
recommends that £. Paul Schwenke1 s application for readmission to the Utah State Bar 
be denied. 
DATED this I day of August, 2001. 
Marji Hanson, Hearing Committee Chair 
Utah State Bar-Character & Fitness Committee 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A PAUL SCHWENKE, 
Plaint i f f, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR, 
De feudal it 
MINUTES 
LAW & MOTION 
i - ml I !VI0" 4 v-* Ml 
Judge: FRANK G. NOEL 
Date: October 24, 2 001 
Clerk: patj 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): A PAUL SCHWENKE 
BILL MORRISON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHARLES A GRUBER 
Video 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9.44 
This case is before the court for an evidentiary hearing. 
Petitioner's motion to strike the opposition of the Utah State 
Bar, deft's motion in limine, deft's motion to compel, and the 
motion to strike this hearing are argued to the court by respective 
counsel and submitted to the court. 
The court denies all of the motions. 
Other motions ruled on as per read into the record. 
The petitioner makes a motion to withdraw his petit 
strike this hearing. 
The court on its own motion denies the petition cind aw-ii a.i .;;. 
Utah State Bar costs. 
Deft to file memorandum of costs within 10 days. 
Petitioner has 10 days to file a response. 
Deft has 5 days thereafter to file his response arid then i: le i s to 
file a notice to submit. 
Charles Gruber to prepare the order. 
Page V J.O.O w J 
Charles A. Gruber, #7391 
Assistant Counsel 
Office of Professional Conduct 
UTAH STATE BAR 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-9110 
By. 
FfUBDSSTBrCTCOBRT 
Th\rri Judicial District 
NOV 19 2001 
I SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Cferk" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
A. Paul Schwenke, #03951 
Respondent 
ORDER: 
i DENYING Respondent's Motion 
i to Strike OPC's Opposition and to Strike 
i OPC's Discovery; 
i DENYING Petitioner's Motion to Strike 
i Hearing; 
I DENYING OPC'S Motion in Limine; 
i DENYING OPC'S Motion to Compel 
i DENYING PETITIONER'S 
i VERIFIED PETITION FOR READMISSION 
I Civil No. 010907939 Ml 
i Judge Frank G. Noel 
On October 24, 2001 Court called this case for trial. The Utah State Bar's Office 
of Professional Conduct appeared and was represented by Charles A. Gruber. A Paul 
Schwenke ("Petitioner/Respondent") appeared and was represented by himself along 
with co-counsel William P. Morrison. 
Mr. Schwenke filed his Verified Petition asking to be readmitted to the practice of 
law on July 3, 2001 in the Fourth Judicial District On August 30, 2001, the OPC filed its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. Schwenke" Verified Petition. 
Included among the exhibits attached to the OPG's Opposition were the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation made by the Character and Fitness 
Committee of the Utah State Bar. Pursuant to Rule 25(e)(4) Rules c: Il ' III a w ) er Discipline 
and Disability ("RLDD") a copy of the Character and Fitness Committee's report and 
re for 
read mission. 
with its supporting memorandum. On or about August 9, 2001, Mr. Schwenke served 
his oppo 
reply to Mr. Schwenke's opposition to the OPC's motion to transfer. On August 23, 
2 I 
District Court signed its order transferring this matter to the Third Judicial District Court. 
On - aiiii(jijis.l i ,)„ iiODI, Hie O K ! sei uni JI jp / ml IIIiup HIIFI li.inslprnii | /nine h\ m«*il iii 
Mr. Schwenke. 
After IIlib matter was transferred \ udicial Distn i 
motion, on October 1, 2001 set a Scheduling telephone conference call for October 17, 
Z:\Schwenke PauftReinstatement 01-0585\Pleadings\ordefKJenypetition.doc 
2001. At that scheduling conference, the Court set a two day hearing on Mr. 
Schwenke's Verified Peition in this matter for October 24 and 25, 2001. 
On the first day of the hearing on October 24, 2001, the following Motions were 
considered by this Court: 
1. Mr. Schwenke's Motion to Strike OPC's Opposition to the Verified 
Petition, to Strike the Character and Fitness Report, and to Strike the OPC's 
Discovery Requests. The OPC filed separate oppositions to each of the three parts of 
that Motion on October 23, 2001. 
2. Mr. Schwenke's Motion Regarding Rule 25 Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability and 90 Day Issue. Mr. Schwenke did not file a written motion regarding 
this issue, but orally made this motion at the beginning of the trial on October 24, 2001. 
3. Utah State Bar/Office of Professional Conduct's ("OPC") Motion in 
Limine re Petitioner's Incomplete or Evasive Responses or His Failure to 
Respond to OPC's Written Discovery Request and Failure to Respond Timely to 
the OPC's Request for Admissions. The Petitioner filed no opposition to this Motion. 
4. OPC 's Motion To Compel Discovery Responses. The OPC filed this 
Motion and supporting memorandum on October 12, 2001. Mr. Schwenke did not file 
an opposition to this motion. 
The Court, having reviewed the above listed Motions and the exhibits and 
affidavits attached to them, and any oppositions, and having heard oral arguments by 
Z:\Schvnnk* PaulWeirwWamef* 01-O585\PtMding(tonj«'-dMiypetlUan.doc 
the OPC Petitioner and nthpp vise I" ?in 'j tull1 i advised in HIP PIHITIINHS, i i iade HIH 
following rulings on the first day of the hearing, October 2 4 , 2 0 0 1 : 
(1) i I IS HEREBY ORDERED that t /Ir !>ili ivf-nk '!• I'1 Int MI II ."dnl c W'.'s 
Opposition is DENIED. Mr. Schwenke has asked the court to strike the OPC's 
Opposition was not filed within 60 days of "receiving" Mr. Schwenke's as required by 
vvenke's motion to strike on two grounds: 
The Court finds that if the OPC is served prior to the filing of a petition for 
readmission. ne actual date of filing of the 
petition for readmission, in which to file any objection to the petition for 
readmission ay summons rule argued by Mr. Schwenke is not 
analogous. There is no such corollary in the RLDD. It would be problematic 
to i equire the O > respond to a Petition until after the Petition actually has 
been filed. 
finds that 01 11 (Counsel was not served until July 2, 2001. 
The 60th day was August 31, 2001. Since the OPC's Opposition to the 
Verified Petition was filed on August 30, 2001, the OPC's Opposition was 
timely filed. 
| T | S H E R £ B Y F U R T H E R ORDERED that the Mr. Schwenke's oral motion to 
strike the hearing on his petition, since it was not held within the ninety days 
Z:\Schwenke PaulNReinstatement 01^)585\PleadlnQ3V3rdar-d«nypetitten.ctoc 
& & . 
of the filing of his petition, is DENIED. The Court is not prepared to strike this hearing. 
Mr. Schwenke is entitled to a hearing. The Court wants see what Mr. Scenke evidence 
is. Rule 25 RLDD requires a hearing within 90 days, and the hearing was held some 20 
days out; but no one ever requested a hearing in this matter. This matter did not even 
come to this Court's attention until it was transferred to this Court from the Fourth 
Judicial District on a change of venue. The Court then on its own motion scheduled the 
scheduling conference to get the matter moving. No effort was made by either party to 
move it along on the Court's calendar. Therefore, the Court does not feel that the fact 
that the matter is beyond the ninety days prevents the Court from holding a hearing. 
Therefore, the Court denies Mr. Schwenke's request to strike the hearing. 
(3) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Utah State Bar/Office of Professional 
Conduct's ("OPC) Motion in Limine re Petitioner's Failure to Respond to OPC's Written 
Discovery Request and Failure to Respond Timely to the OPC's Request for 
Admissions is hereby DENIED. 
(4) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Utah State Bar/Office of Professional 
Conduct's ("OPC") Motion to Compel Discovery Responses is moot and is hereby 
DENIED. 
(5) IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED the^otirt will take under consideration i i 
Mr. Schwenke's request to strike the Charaete? and Fitness Committee ruling because )* 
it is overly broad. The Court reserves ruling on that motion* « ^^^'"7 . <--}• 
Z:\SchwerfcePaul\ReinsWement 01 -0585\Pleadlng8VofderaenypetitK5n.doc * • — " * e /\J^ 
HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED > 
the OPC's discovery requests is DENIED. 
( 3 ) I Il I- S ill -IEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that interest of justice, tl le C< in i i t 
will not deem that the OPC's request for admission are deemed admitted, and the Court 
will heai Mi Schwenke's evidence. There was m lot sufficient time to do the discovery in 
90 days and not time to file motions to amend any responses to request for admissions. 
After making the orders as listed above, the Court then took a brief recess before 
the taking of evidence. After the recess, Mr. Schwenke and his co-counsel announced 
that Mr. Schwenke would not go forward with the presentation of his case. 
Pursuant to Rule 25(g) and 17(b) RLDD, I In Schwenke has the burden of 
establishing that he has met each of the criteria listed in Rule 25(e) RLDD, OI if not, 
present good and sufficient reason why he should nevertheless be readmitted to the 
practice of law. 
The Court set this matter for a hearing and called this matter for a hearing. Mr. 
Schwenke elected not to present any evidence at the hearing. By failing to go forward 
with presenting evidence in support of his Verified Petition, Mr. Schwenke failed to meet 
his burden of proof. 
Therefore, this Court on its own motion rules that Mr. Schwenke's petition for 
readmission is hereby DENIED because he has declined to present any evidence. 
Z:\Schwenke PaulNReinstatemant 01-0585\Pleading«\order^nyp«tition.ctoc 
The OPC is to file a memorandum of costs within ten days of the hearing. Mr. 
Schwenke is to have ten days thereafter to file his response. The OCP then will have 
five days to reply to that response. Thereafter, the OPC should file a notice to submit. 
DATED: t h i s T ^ d a v of IfW , ,2001 
The Honorable 
District Cou^ud©^ 
BY THE COURT: \ 
- ' Vt 
Approved as to Form: - r ^ ^ - d^wA ^ A ' i 
A. Paul Schwenke, Petitioner/Responj pent V 
Approved as to Form: ^ \>^^A\ t f \i 
£o^d^ <VJU^LS. "M©? 
William Morrison co-counsel s\ / / . 
For Paul Schwenke, Petitioner/Respondent > - < ^ L ^ 
Z.\Schwenke PauARemstatement 01-0585\P!eadings\order-denypetrtioadoc 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of November, 2001 I mailed via U.S. mail, 
postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order to: 
A. Paul Schwenke 
200 North 135 East 
Kanosh, UT 84637 
Respondent. 
And 
William P. Morrison 
352 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Respondent's Co-Counsel. 
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